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Abstract
Similar to research in behavioral psychology, research in
privacy and usable security has focused mainly on West-
ern, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD)
societies. This excludes a large portion of the population
affected by privacy implications of technology. In this work,
we report on a survey (N=117) in which we studied technology-
related privacy concerns of users from different countries,
including developing countries such as Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia, and developed countries such as Germany. By
comparing results from those countries, and relating our
findings to previous work, we brought forth multiple novel
insights that are specific to privacy of users from under-
investigated countries. We discuss the implications of our
findings on the design of privacy protection mechanisms.
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Introduction
Researchers from psychology, economics and cognitive sci-
ence came to a conclusion that much of the research done
in these areas considered subjects who are mainly from
Western, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD)
populations [13]. Henrich et al. [13] brought the commu-
nity’s attention to that fact, and argued that a WEIRD soci-
ety is often a psychological outlier.
Research in privacy and usable security is not an excep-
tion; most of the existing work explored privacy concerns in
developed countries only. This means that there might be
novel privacy concerns that have not been studied in depth
yet. For example, privacy invasions in countries with politi-
cal turbulence might have lethal consequences, or certain
individuals might believe they have the right to invade a cer-
tain family member’s privacy in some societies.
To expand our knowledge of privacy concerns, we explore
the privacy needs of technology users from different coun-
tries through a survey (N=117) that was distributed mainly
in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. By comparing the the
results from Arab and German societies, and by contrasting
the findings to previous work, we extracted a set of novel
insights. For example, we found out that shoulder surfing is
less common in Arab societies compared to Germany, but
credit card theft and hacking are more common in the for-
mer. Our long term aim is to investigate the needs of under
represented user groups.
Related Work
We are not the first to investigate privacy requirements
across multiple countries. Multiple works explored privacy
needs, perceptions, and security-related behavior. Most no-
tably, Harbach et al. collected survey responses from 8286
participants from 8 different countries, including Australia,
Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, the UK, and
the US [10]. They found that compared to participants from
other countries, Japanese participants considered data on
their smartphones to be more sensitive, and German ones
were more likely to find protecting access to their phones to
be important. Dinev et al. compared the perceptions of pri-
vacy about government surveillance across Internet users
from USA and Italy [3]. They found that participants from
Italy had lower privacy concerns, and lower perceived need
for government surveillance compared to those form USA.
In another study, Harbach et al. compared risk perceptions
across USA and Germany [11]. They found that partici-
pants from USA had greater fear of identity theft, while Ger-
man participants were more concerned about hidden costs
in services, as well as frauds and scams in online shopping.
More recently, Eiband et al. collected real shoulder surfing
stories from participants from different countries [6]. The
main bulk of participants came from Germany and Egypt,
but they also had few participants from the USA, Bulgaria,
India, Italy, Romania, Russia and South Korea. Their main
aim was to find real evidence for shoulder surfing in the real
world; they did confirm that it is a real threat that indeed
occurs and has negative consequences on the user.
The cross-cultural and multi-national comparisons reported
in the aforementioned works highlight the vast differences
in privacy perception across different countries. However,
all of the comparisons involved WEIRD countries with the
exception of Eiband et al.’s survey about shoulder surfing
[6]. But even Eiband et al. did not investigate differences
across participants from different countries, and they fo-
cused solely on shoulder surfing while we look into privacy
in technology use in general. Thus, the novelty of our work
lies in the explicit focus on technology-related privacy per-
ceptions of users from Arab societies.
Questionnaire Development
A questionnaire was created to collect experiences with
privacy violations, privacy perceptions and privacy influ-
ences. It was distributed online through social media and
university mailing lists. The questionnaire was distributed to
German participants and Arab participants (Egyptian and
Saudis) residing in their own countries to ensure that no
external cultural influences affected the results.These coun-
tries were selected because they had the most number of
internet users in their region: Germany (72 million), Egypt
(37 million) and Saudi Arabia (24 million) [8].
Questionnaire Design and Limitations
The aim of the questionnaire was to collect data about
privacy invasion incidents and perceptions. Results an-
nonymity was emphasized for topic sensitivity. We relied
on recall of a particular incident to investigate what partici-
pants felt and believed about privacy invasion. No negative
connotations were used throughout the questionnaire and
the terms victim and attacker were replaced by gender neu-
tral personas “Vic” and “Cas” respectively. Gender neutral
pronouns have been used in studies to avoid participant
misunderstanding, most recently by Eiband et al. [6] Two
iterations of pre-study were conducted where the question-
naire was given to 6 participants and their feedback about
understanding the questionnaire and questionnaire orga-
nization was taken into consideration. As with all question-
naires, one of the limitations is the bias of self-report [5].
In addition, due to the sensitivity of the topic, social desir-
ability may have been displayed. Despite our attempt to
make the description neutral, participants may have not
been comfortable describing themselves as the attacker
(“Cas“) or would have preferred reporting situations where
they were victims or observers; only 15% of participants
reported themselves as attackers.
Questionnaire Structure
The questionnaire was divided into five sections. The first
section collected a particular privacy invasion experience
of the participant to be the focus of the questionnaire on-
wards. Participants were asked to freely recollect a privacy
invasion incident and their feelings about this incident. In
case participants didn’t have any incidents to recall, their
answers were discarded for Section 1 and 2. In the next
sections, more details were collected about the incident,
such as the victim’s feeling, type of information accessed,
location of incidence and how it influenced the privacy per-
ception of the participant. We asked participants about their
perceived justifications for privacy invasions: whether they
believed it is acceptable for special situations or individuals
to access their private data. Finally, the last section col-
lected participant demographics. Participants were asked
to rate the honesty of their replies through a five-point Likert
scale to help exclude invalid data [16].
Results and Discussion
Overall we collected a total of 117 responses. 31 partici-
pants were males, 79 were females, and 7 did not report
their gender. We collected 56 responses by participants
from western countries. The biggest group was from Ger-
many (49 participants). While 54 responses were by par-
ticipants from Arab countries, including Egypt (30 partic-
ipants), and Saudi Arabia (22 participants). Participants
ages were between 18-57 with a mean age of 30 (SD=10.6).
Participants were compensated with shopping vouchers or
credit points for their studies.
Types of Experienced Privacy Invasions
We classified the reported stories to 12 categories based
on attacks defined in previous work related to social net-
works [2], shoulder surfing [6], and mobile device shar-
ing/borrowing [14]. We further added credit card theft and
involuntary privacy invasions. In some cases, the story
would fit into several categories. For example, P80 reported
that because a friend used the same password on several
platform, his online account was stolen and the attacker
was able to gain access to the victim’s Facebook, Amazon,
and Google Mail accounts. From there the attacker started
defaming the victim and spreading phishing emails. In that
case, this story was classified as an instance of each of:
identify theft, defamation, and hacking. Figure 1 illustrates
the distribution of the reported stories across participants
from Germany and Arab countries.
Notable differences can be seen in cases of shoulder surf-
ing, with participants Germany experiencing slightly more
shoulder surfing situations. Eiband et al. [6] reported that
shoulder surfing occurs most often in public transport. Our
questionnaire distribution approach, as well as collected
data about the education, residence area, and income of
our participants indicate that our sample belongs mainly to
medium-to-high socio-economic subgroups in each coun-
try; in Germany, all classes of society use public trans-
port, while in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, public transport is
not common for individuals that belong to medium to high
socio-economic subgroups [7]. Hence, a possible reason
for lower shoulder surfing cases in Egypt and Saudi Arabia
is that our sample group do not often use public transport.
Participants from Egypt and Saudi Arabia have more neg-
ative experiences with credit card theft. This might be at-
tributed to two reasons. First, a possibility is the weak credit
card regulations in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in which it is
the user’s responsibility to bear the expenses in case of a
fraud. As a result, credit card users from Egypt and Saudi
Arabia are likely to face more negative experiences, and
this might have resulted in an increased recall bias towards
these events. Second, it is known that credit card usage is
not as popular in Germany as in other countries such as the
United States [11], and that Germans tend to prefer cash
transactions [1]. While we could not find direct comparisons
between credit card usage in the countries involved in our
Figure 1: A categorization of reported privacy invasions revealed
some tendencies.
research, we assume that a reason for experiencing less
credit card thefts is that our German participants do not use
them as often.
Privacy Invasion Platforms
Previous work that investigated shoulder surfing focused
mostly on smartphones and handheld devices [6, 9, 10,
12]. We found that other forms of mobile devices, such as
laptops, are also vulnerable to privacy invasions albeit less
common compared to handheld mobile devices. We col-
lected 48 privacy invasion stories involving smartphones,
28 involving laptop computers, and 16 involving desktop
computers. The rest were distributed among tablets, ATMs.
More than half of the responses by German participants
(55.8%) involved handheld mobile devices, such as smart-
phones. This percentage dropped to 36.4% when consid-
ering stories by Arab participants only. In contrast, more
stories by Arabs involved laptops (34.1%). While laptops
were subject to privacy invasion only in 21.2% of the stories
reported by Germans. The bias towards smartphones in
stories by participants from Germany can be explained by
the same reasons we clarified earlier, related to the use of
public transport. These results suggest that privacy protec-
tion measures should not only consider mobile devices, but
also laptops and stationary devices such as desktops.
Reactions to Privacy Invasions are more Severe in Arab Coun-
tries
When asked if their perception of privacy was influenced
by the incident, participants from Arab countries showed a
tendency to be influenced more often (83.8%) compared
to those from Germany (67.4%). For example, P10 was
a 27 years old female from Egypt. She reported an inci-
dent where someone created a fake Facebook profile using
her name and pictures, and then started sending defam-
ing messages to the victim’s friends. P10 mentioned that
she became more privacy aware; she revised the privacy
settings of her account, added profile restrictions, removed
acquaintances from the friends list, deleted all important
and sensitive messages, and activated 2-step authentica-
tion. We expect that the reason behind the more severe
reactions by participants from Arab countries, is that these
societies are often describe as collectivist cultures, in which
fame and reputation are highly valued [4].
When is Privacy Invasion Justified?
When asked if they would consider privacy violation to be
justified in certain situations, the majority of participants
from Germany highlighted situations where safety is a con-
cern. For example, P59 was a 20 year old from Germany.
He stated “For example, if there is reasonable suspicion
that the person in question is in danger I think that their
safety always comes prior to their privacy”. On the other
hand, participants from Arab countries were more inclined
to find a parents’ invasion of children’s privacy to be jus-
tified. For example, we collected 11 opinions (9 females)
from participants who come from Arab countries that af-
firmed this. Participants thought it is justified to monitor “un-
derage children” P29, “son’s mobile [phone]” P41, “children
or teens to protect them” P47. These views were common
across participants from: Saudi Arabia; P46 finds it justified
to invade privacy of children “If the parent, sibling suspect
that their kid, sibling is in danger or being harassed”, as well
as those from Egypt; P48 thinks it is justified “if someone
is worried about the wellbeing or behaviour of their loved
ones. I wouldn’t do it with a spouse but I would with kids if I
were worried they were endangering themselves.”.
Children’s privacy is a controversial topic. It is important to
design privacy protection knowing that. In one view, pre-
venting harm to the child is the priority, but the harm of in-
fringing on a child’s privacy should also be taken into ac-
count [15]. Privacy protection mechanisms should be de-
signed with this in mind; how exactly such mechanisms can
be implemented requires an in-depth investigation.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we reported on our preliminary analysis of 117
survey responses in which we studied technology-related
privacy invasions of users from different countries. We fo-
cused on comparing privacy situations and perceptions in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Germany. We noticed some dif-
ferences due to the collectivist nature of Arab communities,
their sensitivity to reputation, and the lower popularity of
public transport This work only focuses on three countries,
it needs to be extended to be more representative of the di-
versity the Arab world carries.. We also plan to extend it by
in-depth interviews on privacy perceptions and how privacy
violations affect them.
REFERENCES
1. John Bagnall, David Bounie, Kim P. Huynh, Anneke
Kosse, Tobias Schmidt, Scott D. Schuh, and Helmut
Stix. 2014. Consumer Cash Usage: A Cross-Country
Comparison with Payment Diary Survey Data. (2014).
2. Leucio Antonio Cutillo, Refik Molva, and Thorsten
Strufe. 2009. Safebook: A privacy-preserving online
social network leveraging on real-life trust. IEEE
Communications Magazine 47, 12 (2009).
3. Tamara Dinev, Massimo Bellotto, Paul Hart, Vincenzo
Russo, and Ilaria Serra. 2006. Internet Users Privacy
Concerns and Beliefs About Government Surveillance.
Journal of Global Information Management 14, 4
(2006), 57–93.
4. Peter C. Dodd. 1973. Family Honor and the Forces of
Change in Arab Society. International Journal of Middle
East Studies 4, 1 (1973), 40–54.
5. David Dunning, Chip Heath, and Jerry M Suls. 2004.
Flawed self-assessment: Implications for health,
education, and the workplace. Psychological science in
the public interest 5, 3 (2004), 69–106.
6. Malin Eiband, Mohamed Khamis, Emanuel von
Zezschwitz, Heinrich Hussmann, and Florian Alt. 2017.
Understanding Shoulder Surfing in the Wild: Stories
from Users and Observers. In Proc. CHI’17. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 4254–4265.
7. Wafa Elias and Yoram Shiftan. 2012. The influence of
individual’s risk perception and attitudes on travel
behavior. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and
Practice 46, 8 (2012), 1241 – 1251.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0965856412000882
8. Miniwatts Marketing Group. 2018. Internet World Stats.
https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
(2018). Accessed: 2018-02-15.
9. Marian Harbach, Alexander De Luca, and Serge
Egelman. 2016a. The Anatomy of Smartphone
Unlocking: A Field Study of Android Lock Screens. In
Proc. CHI’16. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 4806–4817.
10. Marian Harbach, Alexander De Luca, Nathan Malkin,
and Serge Egelman. 2016b. Keep on Lockin’ in the
Free World: A Multi-National Comparison of
Smartphone Locking. In Proc. CHI’16. ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 4823–4827.
11. Marian Harbach, Sascha Fahl, and Matthew Smith.
2014a. Who’s Afraid of Which Bad Wolf? A Survey of
IT Security Risk Awareness. In Proc. IEEE CSF’14.
97–110.
12. Marian Harbach, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Andreas
Fichtner, Alexander De Luca, and Matthew Smith.
2014b. It’s a Hard Lock Life: A Field Study of
Smartphone (Un)Locking Behavior and Risk
Perception. In Proc. SOUPS’14. USENIX Association,
Menlo Park, CA, 213–230.
13. Joseph Henrich, Steven J Heine, and Ara Norenzayan.
2010. The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 33, 2-3 (2010), 61–83.
14. Amy K Karlson, AJ Brush, and Stuart Schechter. 2009.
Can i borrow your phone?: understanding concerns
when sharing mobile phones. In Proc. CHI’09. ACM,
1647–1650.
15. Benjamin Shmueli and Ayelet Blecher-Prigat. 2010.
Privacy for children. Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 42
(2010), 759–796.
16. Emanuel Von Zezschwitz, Alexander De Luca, Philipp
Janssen, and Heinrich Hussmann. 2015. Easy to draw,
but hard to trace?: On the observability of grid-based
(un) lock patterns. In Proc. CHI’15. ACM, 2339–2342.
